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ABSTRACT
INTERACTION AND INFORMATION IN GROUP RISK TAKING

by
RICHARD ST. JEAN
The purpose of the present investigation was to examine sane of
the processes involved in group risk taking.

Brown's value hypothesis

holds that people value risk individually and that this tendency becomes
enhanced when they become aware of the amount of risk that others are
willing to take.

A second possibility is that people initially value

riekbutthat the change-inducing process involves the production and
recognition of substantive arguments relevant to the taking of a risky
or conservative position.

Thus, an immediate aim of the study was to

single out the relative contributions of these two agents, risk-level
exchange and the development of relevant arguments, to the production of
risk-taking shifts in groups.
A second concern was with the effect of interactional processes on
risk-taking behavior.

Three major theories of the shift to risk (leader

ship, responsibility-diffusion, and value theory) have maintained that
face-to-face interaction is a necessary antecedent of the shift to risk
while one (familiarization) has held that it is not.

The present experiment

attempted to examine more closely the effects of this factor by presenting
the same information in both group and non-group contexts.
With respect to the above aims and on the basis of value theory
vii

considerations the following hypotheses were tested:

1) the shift to

risk will be greater in group than in alone conditions; 2) both risklevel information and pro and con information (substantive arguments)
are necessary for the occurrence of a full risky shift and, further, when
presented alone each would occasion a small risky shift; 3) risk-level
information will be as effective in a group as in an alone setting, but
pro and con information will be more effective in an interactional setting.
These hypotheses were tested experimentally by means of a 4 x 2
x 2 factorial design including an information factor, a social interaction
factor, and a pre-post factor.

Hie four levels of information were full

information, pro and con information, risk-level information and no
information (control group). Each level of information occurred for both
a group condition and an alone condition.

Fifteen subjects served in

each of the experimental cells formed by the combination of these two
factors.

The pre- and posttests constituted a repeated-measures factor

for each subject.
The results confirmed the hypothesis that social interaction
increases the shift to risk.
were explicitly disconfirmed.

However, the second and third hypotheses
Full risky shifts were obtained from pro

and con information, but only small insignificant shifts for risk-level
infornation.

Further, in the alone condition there was no shift whatsoever

for risk-level information, but a small shift for pro and con information.
Discussion of the results focused on the formulation of a relevantargument hypothesis as a more viable theoretical proposition than Brown's
risk-level explanation.

This hypothesis holds that substantive

arguments relevant to the risky action are the major cause of the shift
to risk and, further, that the effect of these arguments are greatly
viii

heightened when developed in a group setting,

implications of this hypothesis

and suggestions for future research were considered.in detail.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been a surge of research dealing with
the parameters of risk in decision making (e.g. Kogan and Wallach, 1964,
1967b; Edwards and Slovic, 1965; Slovic, 1962; Pruitt, 1962).

The

parameter of risk is involved whenever there is a desireable goal, a lack
of certainty that it can be readied, and possible negative consequences
for failure (i.e. a prize, sane probability of attaining it, and a stake).
The situation may be one in which these ocnponents are relatively objective
as, for exanple, the decision to stake a certain sum of money for a prize
of known value with a stated probability of success.

On the other hand,

the canponents may be relatively subjective, as when one decides to leave
a relatively secure but dull job for a position that offers excitement
and challenge but no long-term stability.

In both cases risk taking is

involved when the individual elects to stake sanething of value on a
desireable, but uncertain outcome.
The social psychologist becomes involved when the risky decision
making is shared with others.

Many important decisions are made in groups

rather than by individuals working alone.

Our age of participatory

democracy demands that all decisions, small or large, be taken out of the
hands of the autocratic individual and given to the egalitarian group.
In the modem academic world conmittee meetings have become a vray of life.
Suppose, for exanple, the admissions conmittee of College X is faced with
the decision of whether or not to enroll culturally disadvantaged youths
at the risk of lowering academic standards.
willing to tolerate?

How much risk will they be

In many problem situations where an element of
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clanger or risk is involved the final decision will emerge only after many
long hours of group discussion.

The question to be explored in this paper

is the relationship between the experience of group interaction and the
riskiness of the final decision.
From a logical standpoint there are three possible answers that
might be given to this question.

Kogan and Wallach (1967b) give an

extensive discussion of these possibilities.
First, the traditional view has been that group decisions will
be more conservative than individual decisions.

Groups have been thought

to exert a conventionalizing or conforming influence upon their constituent
members.

The participants in the decision-making conference are less

likely to suggest novel or risky ideas for fear of group sanction.

This

claim was set forth by Whyte (1956) in an invective against the process
of conmittee decision making in business settings.

In his view, this

practice has a suppressing influence on boldness and innovation.
indirect support has been found for this proposition.

Sane

Zander and Medow

(1963) found that subjects working in teams more often lowered their
aspirations following a poor performance than did those working individually.
It is possible in this case that shared experiences of failure may have
suppressed any risk-taking proclivities and, thus, have led to advocating
a more cautious decision.

In other words, while this finding offers some

support for Whyte's thesis, it might be difficult to generalize it beyond
those instances in which a failure of aspiration is involved.

In a syl

logistic reasoning task Bamlund (1959) found that groups are more careful
than individuals in the implications they draw.

However, caution in form

ing conclusions may or may not be related to the propensity to take risks.
A second, and perhaps more compelling view, is that the degree
of riskiness characteristic of group decisions somehow represents an
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averaging of individual decisions.

After reviewing a number of empirical

studies Cartwright and Zander (1960) concluded that this is probably the
case.

Their interpretation is that group matters tend to exert direct

influence attempts towards those who deviate in any direction.

This

interpretation receives seme support from Schachter's (1951) observation
that when deviates are perceived as moving towards the group norm there
is a gradual cessation of influence attempts.

More direct support canes

fran a study by Hunt and Rowe (1960) which reports that there was little
or no difference in the riskiness of investment decisions made by groups
in contrast with those made by individuals.

This study has been criticized

by Wallach, Kogan and Bern (1962) on the grounds of methodology.

They

feel that since group interaction was quite brief (15 minutes) and since
the groups met within sight of one another the results should be considered
inconclusive.

However, several recent studies in group risk taking

(Teger and Pruitt, 1967; Zajonc, Wolosin, Wblosin and Loh, 1970) have
evolved procedures utilizing interaction experiences lasting considerably
less than 15 minutes, yet with results replicating studies using longer
procedures.

Other studies (e.g. Teger, Pruitt, St. Jean and Haaland, 1970)

have shown that valid results may be obtained even when groups meet within
sight of one another.
A third possibility is that group decisions may often be more
risky than the average of individual decisions.

Bruner (1962), for

exanple, feels that the process of group interaction in itself encourages
greater risk taking.

The rationale for this view is that groups usually

face the task of finding solutions to problems which individuals have not
been able to solve.

If this is the case group members would have no

reason to fear failure and, thus, should feel free to promote risky or
unconventional alternatives.

Osborne (1957) has indicated that group
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interaction will lead to the proposed of novel and venturesome ideas if
the principles of ''brainstorming" are followed.

In an empirical test of

this contention, Taylor, Berry and Block (1958) found that groups following
these principles actually produced fewer ideas than individuals working
alone.

This finding was corroborated by Dunnette, Campbell and Jaastad

(1963) in a study using industrial work groups.

While these studies are

suggestive neither focused on the risk-taking aspects of the decision
task.

It should be noted that the Synectics approach developed by Gordon

(1961) claims to focus creative resources within a group onto a problem
situation in such a fashion that imaginative and innovative concepts are
developed.
The above studies offer no systematic basis for distinguishing
between group and individual risk taking.

Seme of these have not been

directly concerned with the dimension of risk and others have suffered
from methodological difficulties.

Kogan and Wallach (1967b) have indicated

that studies in this area should fulfill at least two requirements.

First,

subjects should be fully involved with the risk-taking aspects of the
problems.

In other words, risk taking should be a prominent dimension of

the problem situation.

Secondly, group conditions should be structured

in such a manner that they capture the full essentials of an intensive
discussion.

Vhen these prescriptions are met the results of such studies

are fairly uniform.
The Shift to Risk Phenomenon
Ihe effect called the shift-to-risk-phencmenon was first reported
by Stoner (1961) in a master's thesis submitted to the School of Industrial
Management at M.I.T.

Stoner asked his subjects to resolve a number of

"life-dilerma" situations in which the solutions available varied system
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atically in terms of their riskiness.

Subjects first made their decisions

alone and then were formed into groups where they discussed each problem
until a final consensus was established.

The basic finding was that

group decisions were significantly more risky than the average of individual
decisions prior to group discussion.
In this experiment Stoner used the Choice Dilemmas Task, devised
by Wallach and Kogan (1959) for use in assessing individual risk taking.
This instrument takes the form of a questionnaire containing 12 problem
situations.

Each situation depicts a dilemma involving a central figure

who must choose between two courses of action.

One course is consistently

more attractive than the other but has a smaller probability of succeeding.
To illustrate this point a typical item is reproduced:
Mr. Gi, a competent chess player, is participating in a national chess
tournament. In an early match he draws the top-favored player in the
tournament as his opponent. Mr. G. has been given a relatively lew
ranking in view of his performance in previous tournaments. During
the course of play Mr. G. notes the possibility of a deceptive but
risky maneuver which might bring him a quid; victory. At the same
time, if the attempted maneuver should fail, Mr. G. would be left
in an exposed position and defeat would almost certainly follow.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. G. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds that Mr. G. 's deceptive play would succeed.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable
for the risky play in question to be attempted.
Odds are listed as 1 in 10, 3 in 10, 5 in 10, 7 in 10, 9 in 10, and 10 in

10.
All subjects are given a standard set of instructions indicating
that they are to read each problem and check the lowest probability level
deemed acceptable for attempting the risky alternative involved. They
are further instructed that in all cases they are to keep in mind that
the risky alternative, if successful, would be the more desirable for the
central figure involved.

A risk score is ccnputed for each subject by

sunming the probability levels he has chosen for the various problems.
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A comparison is then made betvreen risk scores in individual and group
conditions.
Using the same methodology Wallach, Kogan and Ban (1962) replicated
Stoner's original finding.

They reasoned that since Stoner's subjects

were male graduate students in industrial management the shift to risk
might be accounted for by the mutually-shared role expectations of this
group.

That is, the presence of peers nay have served to remind each

subject that a business executive is expected to take risks in his decision
making.

Tto control for this possible effect the experimenters used groups

composed of either all male or all female undergraduates enrolled in a
liberal-arts curriculum.

Previously unacquainted subjects were used in

order to insure that the outcome could not be attributed to fortuitous
associations between in-group ;status and risk-taking dispositions.
results of this study were essentially the same as Stoner's.

The

Group

decisions exhibited a shift toward greater risk taking when compared
with prediscussion individual decisions.

This held for both sexes.

An

interesting fact is that private decisions made after group discussion
exhibited the same increase in riskiness as appeared in group decisions.
Evidently, the shift to risk is a matter of private as well as public
acceptance.

In addition, this increase in riskiness was maintained even

after a period of two to six wBeks had elapsed subsequent to group discussion.
An important question concerning this shift is whether or not it
can be generalized from the original experimental paradigm.

It should be

noted that the phenomenon has been obtained principally through the use
of the hypothetical questions (Wallach and Kogan, 1959).

Is this effect

restricted to hypothetical problems or will it also be found in actual
risk-taking situations where the welfare of the group participants is
involved? Four studies have addressed themselves to this question.
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The first study (wallach, Kogan and Ben, 1964) involved a system
of risks associated with possible monetary gains and losses contingent
upon the subject's performance on a set of problem-solving items.

Subjects

were asked to decide upon the difficulty level of the problem they would
attempt to solve.

The payoff scale was proportionate to the stated diffi

culty level; harder items paid greater dividends.

The major finding was

that when groups discussed to consensus the difficulty levels to be chosen
the resulting decisions favored higher difficulty levels (and, thus, a
greater degree of risk) than did the average of individual decisions.
A second experiment (Bern, Wallach and Kogan, 1965) involved
the threat of aversive consequences for the failure of risky decisions.
These consequences consisted of painful side effects resulting from ex
posure to various unpleasant odors.

Odors which had a greater likelihood

of producing the side effects paid proportionately higher premiums provided,
of course, that the subject did not actually get the effects.

Thus, the

consequences of failure involved both unpleasant physiological stimulation
and the foregoing of potential monetary gains.

When groups discussed the

probability levels involved they reached decisions that were significantly
more risky than the average of individual decisions.
A study by Pruitt and Teger (1969) has extended the generality
of the risky shift to gambling decisions.

Subjects first filled out a

questionnaire indicating either for a fixed stake what probability of
winning they would like to have or for a fixed probability of winning the
amount of money they would like to risk.

All bets were of zero expected

value; over a long series subjects should break even.

There vas actual

risk involved since one bet was chosen at random by the experimenter and
played off on the roulette wheel.
and then were discussed by groups.

Bets were first decided upon individually
The results indicated that a
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significantly greater degree of risk was decided upon following group
discussion than prior to it.
The shift effect has also been found among groups with previous
professional experience in decisionmaking tasks.

Siegel and Zajonc

(1967) administered a set of hypothetical items to a number of 3-man
groups, each ocnposed of a psychiatrist, a psychologist and a social
worker.

These groups discussed 12 items— 6 drawn from the Choice Dilemmas

Task (1959) and 6 "clinical choice dilemas" devised by the authors to
reflect the type of mental-health problems these groups had previously
worked with.

The basic finding was that a large and significant shift

to risk occurred on both sets of items.

This shift was just as great for

the clinical items as for the items drawn from the Wallach and Kogan list.
Thus, the risky shift was demonstrated for established groups working on
familiar problems.
Taken together, these four studies provide strong support for the
idea that groups will shift to risk in actual as well as in hypothetical
situations.

The question is what mechanisms operate in the context of

group discussion that do not operate in individual decision making.
Explanations of the Shift to Risk
A number of explanations have been put forth in an attempt to
explain the consistency of the group shift to risk.

In recent years a

large body of research has been devoted to the testing of these hypotheses.
Risk Taking as a Function of Leadership Influence
A plausible explanation for this phenomenon might be that those
individuals who are high risk takers in the beginning exert more influence
in group discussion than those who are initially moderate or low.
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Evidence to support this view was found by wallach, Kogan and Bern (1962).
Following discussion, group members were asked to rate each other in
terms of interpersonal influence.

Hie result was that those individuals

who exhibited the greatest degree of risk on the pretest measures were
perceived by other group members to be more influential in the discussion.
In a later study (Wallach and Kogan, 1965), it was found that even when
groups are not required to reach a consensus in the discussion the rela
tionship between initial risk and perceived influence still persists.

In

addition, Rim (1963, 1964a, 1964b, 1966) has reported that high risk
takers rate high an measures of extraversion, need for achievement,
tolerance of ambiguity, radicalism, and interpersonal values of leadership
and recognition.

Thus, the suggestion is that high risk takers are

characterized by a particular constellation of personality traits which
may predipose them to leadership.
There remains a plausible alternative explanation for this
evidence.

It is possible that the perceived influence of high risk

takers was an outgrowth of the group shift to risk rather than being a
cause of it.

It seems natural that those who were originally closest to

the final group product should be perceived as having exerted the greatest
influence.

It is likely that this could occur even without the consensus

requirement since wallach, Kogan and Burt (1965) have reported that group
members recognize that the shift is taking place.
Evidence far this second point of view canes fran two studies
(Nbrdhpjy, 1962; Rabcw, Fowler, Bradford, Hofeller and Shibuya, 1966).
In both studies items were created for which the result was a shift to
greater conservatism following group discussion.

This shift was ac-

catpanied by the finding that those who were initially lowest on risk
taking were perceived as having exerted the greatest influence.

Is it
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possible that high risk takers are persuasive in sane situations but not
in others? The more parsimonious view holds that perceived influence is
a result of the group moving in a particular direction.

However, Kogan

and Wallach (1967b) feel that the evidence on this point remains ambiguous
since "there may be something special about the kinds of items in question
that cause the high risk taker to change his mind (p. 257)
At any rate, it would appear that recently a number of decisive
blows have been struck against the leadership hypothesis.

Teger and

Pruitt (1967), for example, managed to obtain a risky shift in a condition
where the subjects did not engage in discussion but simply revealed to
one another information about their initial choices.

No verbal ccmnunica-

tion was involved since information was exchanged simply by displaying
cards inscribed with probability values.

In this situation high risk

takers had no opportunity to be persuasive yet a risky shift was still
obtained.

Although it may be argued that sane influence still took place

it would hardly be fair to attribute this influence to the personality
of the high risk taker.

The findings seem to support some sort of cultural

value mechanism (discussed later) rather than a leadership explanation.
In a recent study Wallach, Kogan and Burt (1968) attempted to
determine if the shift to risk could be attributed to greater persuasive
ness on the part of risk takers than an the part of conservatives.

On

the basis of responses to the Choice Dilenroas Task discussion groups were
formed such that the variability of risk-taking dispositions within each
group was extremely high.

Each group then discussed risk-neutral material

and each of the members was rated in terms of perceived influence.

Use

of risk-neutral materials prevented the possible contaminating influence
of a shift to risk making the high risk taker appear more persuasive.
Results indicated that for males there was no relation between riskiness
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and perceived influence.

Far female groups there was a slight positive

relationship between riskiness and perceived influence.

Die authors

conclude that, in general, the risky shift cannot be attributed to greater
persuasiveness on the part of risk takers.
Just the opposite approach was taken in a very recent study by
Hoyt and Stoner (1968).

Subjects were assigned to discussion groups on

the basis of risk-taking homogeneity rather than heterogeneity.

It was

assumed that this procedure would neutralize any leadership effects of
high risk takers and, according to the leadership hypothesis, prevent a
risky shift from occurring.

Despite this procedure substantial risky

shifts were produced in the following discussions.

This evidence combined

with that of the two previously reported studies indicates that the leadership hypothesis does not provide a very adequate explanation of the shift
to risk.‘
Diffusion of Responsibility
By far, the greatest amount of empirical research in this field
has been accomplished through the efforts of Wallach, Kogan, and their
collaborators.

They have proposed that "...individuals, when constituted

as a group, experience a diffusion of responsibility as a product of the
knowledge that one is deciding upon an action jointly with others rather
than deciding by oneself (wallach, Kogan and Bern, 1964, p. 263)." They
further report that responsibility diffusion is mediated by the formation
of affective bends which enables the individual group member to feel less
than proportionately to blame when he considers the possibility of failure.
Rettig (1966) offers the similar explanation that the process of ocmrunication set in motion by grcup discussion may result in a lowered expectancy
of being censured and a greater feeling of security.

His study, however,
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is concerned with predicted ethical risk taking in Which the social
desirability of the risky action is low.
Kogan and wallach feel that the notion of responsibility diffusion
has received strong support in several studies.

In one, (wallach, Kogan

and Burt, 1967) groups were ccnposed homogeneously of either fielddependent or field-independent members.

It was found that longer discus

sions of field-dependent groups resulted in a stronger risky shift whereas
longer discussions among the field-independents weakened the shift.

The

authors reasoned that longer discussions enhanced the affective bonds
among the field-dependents. Among the field-independents longer discus
sions were characterized by a more intellectual or cognitive style of
discussion which, they assume, is not conducive to the formation of
emotional ties.

In addition, they found significant positive correlations

between the amount of risky shift exhibited by a field-dependent member
and the degree of risky shift he attributed to the group of which he was
a member.

It is held that this process of projecting one's own behavior

onto the group can be seen as a means far minimizing personal responsibility.
No such relationship was found for the field-independents who, presumably,
are not prone to minimizing personal responsibility.
Kogan and wallach (1967a) found that groups ccnposed homogeneously
of high test-anxious subjects exhibited a stronger shift to risk than
randomly ccnposed groups.

The interpretation is that high-anxious indi

viduals are more than normally concerned about negative outcomes and, thus,
have more responsibility to diffuse.

This idea was also supported through

a study performed by wallach, Kogan and Bern (1964).

One of the manipula

tions involved setting up a condition in which one subject was induced
to feel responsible for the wins and losses of others in the group as
well as his own. When these "responsible" subjects arrived at a decision
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after discussion with other group matters they manifested a strong shift
to risk.

The authors interpret this to he a consequence of the fact that

the individuals involved felt a greater than usual amount of responsibility
and, thus, had more responsibility to diffuse.
It is interesting to note that Marquis (1962) obtained the same
results in a similar study, yet drew opposite conclusions.

Marquis reasoned

that since one member is deemed to be responsible he should not have the
same freedom as other group members to experience a diffusion of responsi
bility. . Since a shift to risk was obtained anyway Marquis concluded that
responsibility diffusion could not account for the results.
It would seem that the above evidence is rather equivocal with
respect to the theory.

On the basis of their results, Fabow et. al. (1966)

conclude that diffusion of responsibility, although not ruled out, is
insufficient to account for all the data.

The Rabcw study utilized items

for which there was a shift to greater conservatism rather than risk.
These items were constructed on the basis of a norm-conflict prescription
in which the cautious alternative is supported by societal norms whereas
the more desirable and risky alternative does not receive normative
support.

To illustrate this point a typical item is reproduced:

A very small ccmrunity has sponsored the medical education of a young
doctor in order to replace the older and only doctor of that community.
The young doctor mist decide whether or not to follow up a research
idea which may produce an important medical advance, a decision that
will prevent him from returning to the small ccmrunity (p. 20).
In this case each subject is asked to decide what the odds should be of
the research being a success before he would advise the doctor to follow
up his idea.
Responsibility diffusion was formulated to account for shifts to
risk, not shifts to conservation.

It cannot be invoked to account far

both because then it would be no explanation at all.

However, Kogan and
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Wallach (1967b) have attacked the Rabcw study on the grounds that the
risky alternative does not appear to be of much greater desirability
than the cautious alternative.

This criticism, though, can also be

applied to an item used by Wallach, Kogan and Bern (1962) for which risky
shifts have been observed:
A college senior with considerable musical talent must choose between
the secure course of going on to medical school and beaming a
physician, or the risky course of embarking on the career of a concert
pianist (p. 77).
It would not appear from the item itself that beaming a concert pianist
is more desirable than going to medical school.

Yet, it must be remembered

that the instructions urge the subject to always keep in mind that the
risky alternative is more desirable to the central figure involved.
Since Rabow et. al. used the same instructions this criticism of Kogan
and Wallach must be considered untenable.
Before leaving this issue it is necessary to consider one more
test of the responsibility-diffusion hypothesis.

Pruitt and Teger (1967)

report a study in which they vised an actual gambling situation in order
to insure that there would be a concrete outcome to give seme substance
to feelings of responsibility.

Subjects first answered items about the

amount of money they would be willing to risk and what odds they would
be willing to take.
risk items.

Next, they met in small groups to discuss seme non-

It was assumed that group interaction would allow the affec

tive bonds to develop which are supposed to mediate diffusion of responsi
bility.

Following group discussion, subjects were told to make new

decisions on the gambling items with the instruction that their decisions
would be averaged with those of other group members.

This would produce

a final group decision which was to be played off for money.
The authors reasoned that this procedure should promote diffusion
of responsibility since all of the group members were participating in
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the final group decision.

Instead of producing shifts to risk, this

procedure resulted in nonsignificant shifts toward conservatism.

This

finding would seem to iitply that responsibility-diffusion, if it does
occur, is not sufficient to produce the shift toward risk.

In a personal

statement to Pruitt and Teger (cited in Pruitt and Teger, 1967), Kogan
cemented that responsibility-diffusion would occur only if information
is available about the level of risk that other group members are taking.
However, as Pruitt and Teger point out, if this is the case then the
responsibility-diffusion hypothesis needs to be restated.

As it stands

new it does not provide a very adequate explanation.
Risk Taking through Familiarization
Recently, Bateson (1966) has proposed a familiarization hypothesis
which maintains that a more thorough consideration and understanding of
the risk-taking problems on the part of the subjects involved may in
itself lead to greater riskiness on the posttest measure.

He has supported

this contention through utilization of a procedure in which subjects,
after completing the pretest, are instructed to familiarize themselves
with the Choice Dilenma items by writing out pros and cons for each action.
A significant shift to risk was observed on the posttest measures,

This

shift was of approximately the same magnitude as that obtained in the
group discussion procedure.

In interpreting these results Bateson argues

that group discussion may result in a greater familiarization with the
relevant facts of the problem and that greater familiarization in itself
leads to a greater willingness to advocate risky solutions.
Flanders and Thistlethwaite (1967) augments this argunent.

A study by
They found

that familiarization produced as great a shift as did discussion and, more
importantly, that familiarization followed by discussion did not produce
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any greater magnitude in the shift to risk.

They concluded that the shift

to risk results fran a pseudo-rather than a true-group factor.
In acxeoent paper, however, Kogan and Wallach (1967c) have
challenged the results of the familiarization studies.

They set up two

conditions, one of which was a typical group discussion while the other
was a type of familiarization condition in which subjects listened to
tape recordings of the group discussions.

Risky shifts were manifested

in both conditions, but the risky shifts under the discussion condition
were significantly larger than under the familiarization-by-listening
condition.

They argued that the same information was available to groups

in both conditions and that if familiarization alone were sufficient to
account for the risky shift it should be of the same magnitude in both
conditions.

These results appear to contradict those reported by Flanders

and Thistlethwaite.
A detailed investigation of the above studies reveals subtle
differences in procedure.

In their familiarization instructions Flanders

and Thistlethwaite created in their subjects the explicit expectation
that they were to prepare for a group discussion although, in actuality,
no discussion was to follow.

Part of their instructions read:

"We want

each of you to be prepared to discuss the choices to be made so that you
will not have to spend group discussion time restudying the problem (p. 93)."
Kogan and Wallach, hcwever, did not lead their subjects to believe that
they would engage in a group discussion or in any way make their decisions
public.

In a recent study at the University of New Hampshire (cited in

Teger, Pruitt, St. Jean and Haaland, 1970) this parameter was investigated.
TWo familiarization conditions were used.

In one, subjects wrote out pros

and cons for the Choice Dilemmas Task while under the impression that they
were to make new choices which would be revealed in subsequent group
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discussion.

The subjects made posttest choices, but no discussion followed.

In thft-other familiarization condition subjects also wrote out pros and
cons but while under the impression that their subsequent choices would
remain private.

In addition, a traditional group-discussion procedure

was run for purposes of octrparison.

Significant shifts to risk were found

after group discussion but, surprisingly, neither familiarization condition
produced significant shifts in either direction.
A number of other attempts have been made to replicate the familiar
ization studies (Teger, Pruitt, St. Jean and Haaland, 1970).

Several

familiarization procedures have been used including exact replications of
both Batesonvs and Flanders's and Thistlethwaite1s procedures.

In none

of these studies has a significant shift to risk been observed.

It now

seems likely that the shift observed in the Kogan and Whllach familiariza
tion condition was an outgrowth of subjects' vicarious experiencing of
group interaction.

Bateson's shift may have been due to the fact that

his study was run in England and English students may be prone to studying
a problem carefully before making a decision.

Thus, on the pretest

subjects may have been hesitant to accept a great deed, of risk since they
had not had time to study the problems carefully.

However, unless we

assume a Type I error it is extremely difficult to account for the results
of Flanders and Thistlethwaite.
The comprehension hypothesis has still another shortcoming.
explains only shifts to risk, not shifts to conservatism,

It

in order to

explain both types of shifts it would have to be oombined with some
other explanation such as value theory discussed next.
Risk Taking as a Function of Value Orientation

In an attempt to explain both shifts to risk and shifts to
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conservatism Brown (1965) has proposed a "value" hypothesis.

He feels

that the content of the traditional risk-taking items has been such that
the risky alternatives involved are more apt to be supported by cultural
or societal values than are the conservative ones.

Thus, subjects perceive

most of the Choice Dilemma items as warranting a risky approach.

It will

be noted that American culture supports the talcing of risks in many concrete
situations— in quiz shews, in sports, on the battlefield, etc.

Madaras

and Bern (1968) have shewn that risk-acceptors, in general, are seen as
having more socially-desirable characteristics than risk-rejectors. How
ever, in seme situations the approved approach is a conservative one.
Therefore, Brown asserts that people value both risk and caution according
to the circumstances and a risk-taking item may engage either the value
on risk or the value on caution.

Whichever value is engaged will influence

the flew of information in such a manner that group members will bring
forth more statements supporting the value than opposing it.

Thus, it

might be supposed that if more information is brought out supporting a
risk approach the grcup would shift in that direction.
Seme support for this notion has been obtained by Nordhfy (1962)
who analyzed the verbal content of grcup discussions of the Choice Dilemma
items.

For 10 of the 12 items there were a greater number of statements

supporting risk than caution. These were the same items for which there
were shifts to risk.

For the other two items there were a greater number

of statements supporting the conservative alternatives.
showed nonsignificant shifts toward conservatism.

These items

However, Wallach and

Kogan (1967b) have argued that this finding dees not necessarily support
the value position.

They claim that if groups are going to shift to risk

anyway a natural outgrowth of this process would be the production of
a greater number of statements justifying a risky approach.

In this
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instance, therefore, it is difficult to ascertain which is the cause and
which the effect.
Hinds (1962) has reported results which have more significance
for value theory.

In conjunction with the administration of the Choice

Dilenroa items he asked his subjects to indicate what alternatives would
be chosen by most other people.
would be more conservative.

Subjects consistently guessed that others

Brown interprets this to mean that each

person taking the test conceives himself to be at least as risky as the
average of his peers.

Thus, the process of group discussion serves to

inform each subject of how other group members have actually chosen.

The

shift to risk occurs since those who find themselves to be belcw the
average will revise their decisions in an upward direction.

On the norm-

oonflict items devised by Rabcw et. al. (1966) the theory is that subjects
originally define the items as warranting a cautious approach and assume
that the/ are being at least as cautious as others.

When group discussion

informs them that others are being even more conservative they recast
their decisions into a more conservative framework. This theory, then,
rests on the dual assumptions that people like to be in tune with the
cultural values as they see them and, furthermore, when they find they
are not they suffer a type of cognitive dissonance which results in deci
sion change.
It should be noted that by this theory the actual flow of argnnents,
the substantive aspect of the interaction, is not important in the pro
duction of the shift:

"The content of the discussion, the arguments pro

and con, are of no importance by this theory.

It is the information about

other people's answers that makes individuals move toward greater risk
after group discussion (Brown, p. 702)." Die fact that more risky than
cautious information is produced in group discussion may be seen as a
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justification for the already shifting decision.
A partial test of this theory was conducted by Whllach and Kogan
(1965).

They established a condition in which subjects were required

to reach a consensus on each of the Choioe Dilemma items without engaging
in discussion.

The procedure called for the experimenter to post each

subject's decision on the blackboard for all to refer to.

Several rounds

of choices were made in this fashion until consensus was achieved.

Since

each subject received information about the degree of risk taken by other
group members Brown's theory would predict that those whose choices were
less risky than the average would choose for greater risk on the next
ballot.

However, the final decisions represented an averaging effect

rather than an overall shift.
Teger and Pruitt (1967) have criticized this study on the grounds
that the consensus-vdthout-discussion requirement may have left the
subjects with the irrpression that an averaging strategy was the only one
available.

Accordingly, the study was replicated without a consensus

requirement and the posttest measures indicated a small but significant
shift to risk.

A larger shift to risk resulted from a comparison dis

cussion condition.

This finding can be considered to be compatible with

the value theory.

While the posting of decisions provides some informa

tion about the views of others this opportunity should be greatly enhanced
by the verbal exchange within group discussion.
Pruitt and Teger (1967) cite other evidence which they feel to
be in line with the value theory.

If each risk-taking item is originally

defined as warranting either a risky or a conservative approach these
values should be reflected by the initial choices on the pretest.

In

addition, there should be a positive correlation between initial risk
and risky shift.

Essentially, this is what Pruitt and Teger have found.
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Items for which choices are originally risky reflect a shift to even
greater risk after discussion.

Likewise, originally conservative choices

become even more conservative.

This is consistent with Brown's predic

tion that a risk-taking item will engage one of the two values and,
through group discussion, exhibit shifts in the value-specified direction.
These authors have further reasoned that the difference between
initial risk and the risk others are assumed to be talcing (Hind's procedure)
should, if the theory is right, yield a prediction of the size of the
risky shift.

The rationale is that "the farther ahead of the pack one

initially thinks he is, the more catching up he has to do when he finds
that he is performing in an average fashion (Pruitt and Teger, 1967;
p. 16)." That is, there should be a positive correlation between risky
shift and the amount of risk subjects assure others to be taking minus
their own initial risk.

Since small nonsignificant correlations were

found this prediction was not borne out.
However, the relevance of this finding for value theory can be
called into question.

Brcwn's prediction was that those who find them

selves to be below average will revise their decisions toward greater
risk.

They want to be at least as risky as others.

Thus, it would not

natter hew far ahead of the pack one assumes oneself to be.

The only

measure of relevance is whether or not one is actually belcw the mean
of the other members' decisions.

The shift to risk is based on a few

individuals revising their decisions, not the whole group.

One could

predict, though, that degree of risky shift would bear seme relation to
how far belcw the mean a group member finds himself to be.
This idea receives support from a very recent study by Vidmar
(1969).

On the basis of initial reactions to the risk items he determined

each member's relative initial risk position in the group.

Following the
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posttest choices it was found that magnitude of initial risky shift was
inversely related to the member's relative initial position.
who were farthest below the mean shifted most.

Thus, those

In addition, he compared

homogeneous groups consisting of either high, medium or low risk takers
with heterogeneous groups composed of two high, one medium, and two low
risk members.

All composition conditions exhibited shifts toward risk

but groups in the heterogeneous condition showed significantly greater
shifts than groups in the other conditions.

Thus, as Brown predicts, it

appears that heterogeneity of risk preferences is an important factor in
the shift to risk.
It is interesting to note that Whllach appears to have abandoned
the xresponsibility-diffusion hypothesis and embraced the value position.
He and his colleague report a study (Whllach and Wing, 1968) which represents
a more extensive version of Hinds' (1962) report.

Six of the twelve

Choice Dilemma items were administered to almost 500 pre-college subjects.
They responded with both their own risk preferences and those that they
felt the majority of their peers would make.

On all six items subjects

guessed that the majority of their peers would make more conservative
choices than they themselves.

This is in line with value theory which

suggests that on risk-oriented items (as these were) subjects would feel
themselves to be as risky or riskier than the majority of their fellows.
Wallach and Wing new feel that this "...interpretation may well account
for the lion's share of the group-induced risky-shift effect (p. 105)."
The value explanation has been supported and extended by another
similar study (Levinger and Schneider, 1969).

The subjects involved

responded to the Choice Dilemma items in three ways:

(1) their own

preference, (2) how they felt their peers wculd choose, and (3) the choice
they felt was most admirable.

The authors felt that if, risk is a positive

23
value the choice selected as most admirable would represent a riskier
position than the initial choice.

Although one is left with the question

of why the subjects would not originally choose the most admirable
position the results were in line with the hypothesis as stated.

In

general, subjects assumed peers to be more conservative and they most
admired choices vdiich were riskier than their am.

These results did not

hold for those items in which previous research had indicated inconsistent
shifts or shifts in the cautious direction.

The authors suggest that

during discussion the group members discover that the decisions of others
are more risky than previously they believed and, thus, feel more freedom
to move toward the positively-valued positions.
Perhaps the most catpelling evidence for value theory ccmes
frcm the same researcher who first reported the occurrence of the shift
to risk phenomenon.
questionnaire.

Stoner (1968) presented his subjects with a 12-item

Six were assumed to be risk-shifting items, and the others

were felt to be caution-shifting.

Subjects also completed a "value

ranking instrument" which required them to rank 18 phrases in the order
of their perceived importance.

The phrases were written to describe

values which were implicit in each of the alternative outcomes in the
12 dilemma items.

On the basis of subjects' rankings the 12 dilenma items

were divided into 2 groups:

those for which the risk/ alternatives were

ranked higher in importance than the cautious alternatives and those
for which the opposite was true.

If risk-taking items do engage widely

held values and if the importance of relative values can be specified
in this manner then this procedure should afford us a means of predicting
which way any item will shift through group discussions.

Stoner found

that items classified in this way as being risk-oriented elicited
relatively risky initial decisions and, after group discussion, evoked
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strong shifts to risk.

Items for which the cautious alternatives were

ranked of greater importance had relatively conservative initial decisions.
Four of the six items classified in this way shifted in the conservative
direction although only two of the shifts were significant,

Thus, we

have a means for predicting the direction of the shift in advance and,
although the predictions were far from perfect, Stoner has shewn that
value theory need not be an ex post facto explanation.
Statement of the Problem
At present, value theory is the only major explanation of the
shift to risk phenomenon that has not suffered significant empirical
damage.

The problem is that there are two possible versions of this

theory and previous tests of the value formulation have done nothing to
separate them.
Brown's position (1965, pp. 698-702) is that any risk-taking item
may elicit either the value on risk or the value on caution.

People

like to feel that they are acting in accord with the value specified and
they respond originally in either a risky or conservative fashion.
assure that they are at least as risky or conservative as others.

They
When

some of them find that they are not they shift to a more extreme position
on the value.

According to Brown's position, then, the only information

of relevance is the actual risk preferences of others.

As mentioned,

some support for this position has been given by Teger and Pruitt (1967)
who have reported that when group members do nothing but exchange risklevel information there is a small but significant shift to risk.
The verbal interplay and the arguments pro and con should be of
no importance (Brown, 1965).

Yet, Nondhjfy's (1962) study indicates that

risk-oriented items are accompanied by discussions in which there are a
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greater nuttier of statements supporting risk than caution.

Wallach and

Kogan (1967b) have argued that if groups are going to shift to risk any
way a natural outgrowth of this process would be the production of a
greater nutter of statements justifying a risky approach.
a second possibility.

But there is

The flow of substantive arguments/ the pros and

cons involved, may themselves play a causal role in the shift to risk.
It should be noted that a test of this second possibility also
constitutes a crucial test of Brown's position.

Brown would be forced

to predict that no shift to risk would occur in a discussion of the risktaking items in which the giving of specific risk-level information was
not allowed.

This proposition can be tested by means of an experimental

design which compares the potency of various levels of information in
the production of the shift to risk.

Full information (the usual group

discussion) is compared with two levels of partial information (a discussion
which permits risk-level information only and one which permits pro and
con information only). There is also a control group which represents
the extreme of no information.
The hypothesis presented here is that both risk-level information
and pro and con information are necessary for the production of a full
risky shift.

Teger and Pruitt (1967) found that groups will shift to

risk when presented with risk-level information but that this shift is
significantly smaller than that reported for the groups who used the
traditional discussion method.

Thus, it is expected that either risk-

level information or pro and con information by itself will be sufficient
for the production of a small risky shift.

Yet for the full risky shift

it nay be necessary for these two elements to be combined as they are
in the typical group discussion procedure.
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Following the demise of the familiarization hypothesis it appeared
that the shift to risk most be a true-gzoup phenomenon.

That is, the

shift Will only take place through the interaction (face-to-face exchange
of behavior) of several individuals.

Pushed to its logical extreme,

however, Brown's value position must consider the shift to risk to be a
pseudo-group effect.

By this theory the only relevant variable is the

acquisition of information concerning the risk levels of others.

If this

information is made available to subjects subsequent to the ccrpletion
of the pretest they should choose greater risk on the posttest even in
the absence of a group condition.
It is possible, however, that the flow of substantive arguments
(pros and cons) are also basic elements of the shift to risk.

This

would seem to support the contention that the shift to risk is really a
true-gzoup effect.

Yet, might not this information alone produce the

shift to risk when presented in an individual rather than a group context?
A written transcript of a grcup discussion would provide the full infor
mational requirements but without the interactional oonponents.

If a

shift to risk were to appear in this condition it would be necessary to
conclude that actual face-to-face interaction is not crucial to the pro
duction of the shift to risk.

Teger and Kogan have contented that in

this condition a grcup might be implied and if a shift were found it
might better be termed a quasi- rather than a pseudo-group effect (per
sonal ccmunication).
It is still possible that grcup interaction while it nay not
be necessary to the production of the shift may serve to enhance it.
Perhaps information presented in a group condition is more salient than
when presented in an alone condition.

The obverse is also a logical pos

sibility but it seems intuitively more likely that group interaction
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would serve to make more pronounced the value specified by a risk-talcing
item.

Willems (1969) has reported that groups are even more likely than

individuals to report that they are taking more risk than others.

He

interprets this to mean that group interaction enhances the value specified.
Ihe position taken here is that the shift to risk can be produced in a
noninteractional setting but that the addition of social interaction will
serve to make the shift more pronounced.
The present design tests this contention by comparing the four
information levels across both group and alone conditions.

This analysis

permits the identification of experimental interaction effects between
the two major variables.
Hypotheses
The following specific predictions are offered:
(1) There will be a greater shift to risk under group than under alone
conditions.
(2) The shift to risk will be greatest when full information is given,
next greatest for risk-level only information and pro and con information,
and smallest for the no-information condition.

It is not expected that

the risk level only condition and the pro and con condition will be
significantly different.
(3) There will be a statistical interaction to the effect that the
presentation of risk-level information will produce carparable shifts
under both group and alone conditions, while shifts under the other infor
mation levels will be smaller in the alone than in the group conditions.
That is, the magnitude of the shifts under full information and risklevel infatuation should be approximately the same for both levels of
interaction while shifts under the pro and con level should be larger

in the group than in the alone conditions.
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METHOD
The overall experimental plan involves a social-interaction
manipulation resulting in group (A^) and alone (A^) levels, and an
information manipulation resulting in full information (B^), pro and
con information (B^), risk-level information (B^), and no information
(B^) levels.

Thus, there are eight experimental conditions in all.

The

addition of apre-and posttest, repeated measures factor (q, < y produces a 4 x 2 x 2 factorial design (Table 1).

V
TABLE 1
Experimental Design

*1

*2

B^

B.

1

B2

B3

B3

B4

B4
Subjects

One hundred twenty male and female students enrolled in intro
ductory psychology oourses at the University of New Hampshire and at
Nasson College in Springvale, Maine served as subjects.

None of the sub

jects had prior knowledge of the shift to risk phenomenon.
was assigned to one of eight experimental conditions.

Each subject

In accordance with
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prior research procedures only like-sex subjects were run in any one
experimental session.
Materials
Hie materials consisted of six items from the Choice Dilemma
test which had previously been associated with strong shifts to risk
(#'s 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 11 from Kogan and Wallach, 1959— see Appendix)
and verbatim transcripts of group discussions.
Procedure
All subjects were initially pretested on the risk-taking items.
They were instructed to read the instructions printed on the test booklet
and then were further instructed as follows:
There are two points I should like to bring to your attention
which may seem clear enough at the outset, but are easily over-looked
when you become involved in seme of the situations. The first is
that alternative X— the riskier alternative— is always assumed to be
more desirable than the safer course, if X should prove successful.
The second point concerns the meaning of the odds you are
being asked to mark. It is not your task to decide what the odds
might actually be in a lifelike situation. The odds you marie indicate
the lowest odds you would be willing to take and still advise the
central figure to give the risky alternative a try. There is no time
limit so take your time and consider the 6 situations carefully. You
may return to erne if you wish to change your answer after seeing some
of the others. If there are no questions you nay begin.
Subjects ccnpleted the pretest and then, depending on which condition they
had been assigned to, were exposed to one of the following experimental
manipulations.
Group Conditions (A^)
Half of the subjects were run under group conditions.

They met

five at a time and were seated around a large discussion table.

There
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was a tape recorder present and subjects were told that it would be used
to record their discussions.

Subjects were then exposed to an experimental

manipulation which represented one of the four information levels.
Full information (B^). This condition is simply a replication
of the typical group discussion procedure.

These instructions were given:

The questionnaire which you how have in front of you is the
same one you just finished taking. We have had each of you fill out
the questionnaire so that you would became familiar with all of the
situations it contains. What we are really interested in is having
you discuss each of the situations as a group. Let me now describe
the purpose of these discussions. We are trying to develop a set of
case motives for a hunan relations course. This means that we would
like to develop situations for which people are likely to hold many
different points of view. We want to see whether the situations we
constructed will generate a diversify of opinions so your discussions
will tell us hew well the different situations are working out for
our purposes. I am not going to participate in the discussions although
I will be here to answer any procedural questions which may arise. M l
right, let's begin with the first item. Go right ahead.
When the discussion appeared complete the experimenter said the following:
M l right. That was a good discussion. For some of you, it
may have raised issues that you had overlooked when filling out the
questionnaires the first time. New, we would like to find out whether
the discussions influenced your judgment in any way. When making
your decisions now, don't feel bound by what you did when filling out
the questionnaire the first time. If you still feel the same way,
that's quite all right but we should like you to consider each situation
inthe light of the discussion. As I told you before, we're interested
in seeing how much diversity of opinions is generated by each situation.
Obviously the expression of such diversity should have seme impact
on everyone's personal opinions. M l right, go ahead and make your
decisions for the first situation— the one you just discussed.
Pro and con information (B^). Subjects were directed to discuss
each item.

However, they were instructed to refrain from mentioning the

exact level of risk each would advise.

The instructions are the same as

those used in the full-information condition except that the following
phrases were added:
In discussing each item you should concentrate on pointing
out the most important issues to be considered in making each decision.
What do you feel are the pros and cons attached to the risky action?
You should not mention the exact level of risk you would reccrmend
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but only whether in your opinion the central figure should make a
generally risky or a generally conservative decision.
There was a monitor present during each discussion to insure that no mention
was made of specific risk levels.

As usual after each discussion subjects

were asked to indicate their posttest choices.
Risk-level information (B^). This condition closely resembles
the balloting condition of Teger and Pruitt.

However, because of the

interest in assuring vocal interaction subjects were instructed to speak
their preferences rather than display them on cards.

They were instructed

as follows:
The questionnaires you have in front of you are the same
ones you just finished taking. We had you take them the first time
so that you would beccme acquainted with the various problem situations.
What we would like you to do now is to exchange information concerning
the decisions you have made. Each of you will indicate to the others
what level of risk you have chosen for the problem situation. I will
roll a die to determine who goes first and we will continue around
the table in a clockwise direction. When you finish going around
once repeat the procedure until you have done it three times. Remember
that you are limited to indicating the odds you prefer. You are not
allowed at this time to give reasons for your choice.
Consider what you are doing as a form of discussions. You
are each getting an opportunity to ccnpare your initial decision
with that of others. You are also given a chance to change your
decisions if you wish to. Feel free to change your answers at any
time. Remember, if this were the usual form of discussion, many of
you would change your answers for various reasons during the course
of the discussion. Always consider your own decision in light of
others' decisions but in the end do whatever you think is best.
Please do not feel bound by what you marked as your decision on the
practice booklet. Whether or not you change or how much you change
is not important. Vfoat is important is that you reconsider each
answer carefully.
Three rounds of balloting were held.

When this was completed

each subject was asked to make a final decision on each item.
Kb-information
(Bj.
— —
—
4

—

This was a control condition.

After

completion of the pretest subjects were handed copies of nonrisk items
which they were to discuss.

For this purpose the"doodlebug problem"
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developed by Rokeach (1960, pp. 171-181) was used.

Subjects were instructed

as follows:
Each of you new has a copy of what we call the doodlebug
problem. It is a problem in logical reasoning. You are asked to
describe the circumstances that Joe must have been in to lead him
to his correct conclusion that only four jimps are required. We
would now like you to discuss this problem as a group to see if
among the five of you you can core to a correct solution concerning
Joe's circumstances. You are to continue the discussion until all
of you agree on what that correct solution must be. I will not
take part in the discussion but I will be here to answer any procedural
questions that arise. All right, begin if there are no questions.
When the discussions were finished the experimenter passed out new copies
of the risk-taking questionnaire.

Subjects were instructed as follows:

The questionnaires you new have cure the same ones you took
earlier. We would now like to have you go back over them and reconsider
each item carefully. We are not interested in seeing if you can
remember the answers you put down the first time.but rather we would
like to have you rethink each problem. Sane new thoughts may occur to
you that you did not consider first time. If you still feel the same
way that is all right but we are interested in finding out what your
personal decision is at this time.
Alone Conditions (A^)
The following procedures pertain to subjects run in non-interacting
conditions.
roans.

For each condition subjects were run individually in isolated

They were allowed no opportunity to interact.
Full information (B^). Subjects in this condition were exposed

to the full information that is engendered in a typical group discussion.
Each subject was presented with a verbatim transcript of a previous group
discussion.

He was instructed as follows:

The questionnaire you new have in front of you is the same
as the one you just finished taking. We had you take it the first
time so you would become familiar with all the situations it contains.
Many people feel that they could make better choices on each
item if they had more information concerning the problem situations.
In the past we have had various groups discuss each problem in order
that we might get a better idea of the pros and cons involved in
making each decision. In order that you might have a better idea
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of what these pros and cons are we have prepared a verbatim transcript
of a typical discussion. We should like you to read the transcript
and indicate in the spaces provided what other pros and cans you feel
the group should have considered. Since you may not previously have
considered sane of the information brought to light in the group
discussion we would like you to reconsider each situation and make
a new decision for each. If you do not wish to change your original
decision that is perfectly all right. What is important is that you
reconsider each decision in the light of the group discussion. Please
mark what you feel to be the best decision.
Pro and con information (B2>. This condition was very similar
to the full-information condition.
transcripts of group discussions.

Subjects were presented with verbatim
However, the transcripts used were

derived from the recordings made of the discussions in which subjects
discussed pros and cons only and were not allowed to reveal risk-level
information.

Hie instructions used in the full-information condition

were repeated here.
Risk-level information (B^). Subjects were asked to reconsider
each of their initial decisions in the light of responses given by others.
They were presented with the actual pretest risk preferences of other
subjects who were being run in neighboring experimental roans at the same
/

time.

Each subject remained alone in his roam and was individually

instructed as follows:
The questionnaire you new have in front of you is the same
one you gust finished taking, we had you take it the first time so
that you would became familiar with all of the situations it contains.
Many people are interested in finding out how others respond
to these same questions, we thought you would be interested in seeing
how the other people present have responded. On the attached sheet
you will find an account of hew other people present have actually
answered. After looking at this information we would like you to
go through and reconsider each of the problem situations. Hie way
others answered may have brought new issues to mind. Please restudy
each item and indicate on the questionnaire whatever your decision
is at the present time. Do not feel bound by what you marked an the
practice booklet the first time. Vhether you change or not is unim
portant— we are only interested in seeing what your personal decision
is now. You can take as much time as you need.

(

'
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No-information (B.). This represents the control condition
--------------- 4
for the non-interacting sessions.

After taking the pretest, subjects

were asked to work on the doodlebug problems by themselves.

Following

this they were given the same instructions for completing the posttest
as in the interacting condition.
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RESULTS
A pretest and posttest risk-taking score was computed for each
subject.

This score represents the arithmetic sum of the subject's

risk preferences over the six items.
a whole nunber.

The risk preference is scored as

For example, if a subject chose 3 in 10, 5 in 10, 7 in

10, 5 in 10, 9 in 10, and 1 in 10 as his six risk preferences his score
would be 30.

The possible range of scores extends fran six (maximum

risk) to 60 (maximun caution). Table 2 contains mean pre- and posttest
scores for the fifteen subjects in each experimental condition.
Initial homogeneity of variance for the various samples can be
assumed.

An F maximum test (Winer, 1962) performed upon the initial

samples yielded an F ratio of 3.44 (df = 19; k = 8) Which is not signifi
cant at the .05 level.
An analysis of variance for repeated measures was performed on
the individual risk scores.

The results are presented in Table 3.

only significant main effect was due to the pre-post factor.
across all treatment conditions
from pretest to posttest.

The

Averaged

there was a significant shift to risk

However, the presence of statistical interac

tion effects indicates that this shift was not independent of either the
information or social interaction factor.
Hypothesis 1 stated that there would be a greater shift to risk
under group than under alone conditions.

Hie main effect far the interac

tion factor did not reach an acceptable level of statistical significance.
However, the main effect for social interaction disregards pre and posttest
differences.

Hie important statistic for testing this hypothesis is the
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TABLE 2*
Mean Bisk Score for Each Treatment Condition

Condition

Group
A1

Pre
C1

Full
Pro and Con Risk-level
No
Information Information Information Information
b3
*1
B2
B4

30.67

35.33

27.93

27.00

24.80

30.20

26.20

26.13

30.60

33.13

37.60

28.13

28.33

31.06

37.60

27.82

Post
C2

Pre
Alone
A2

S.
Post
C2

*Each entry represents the mean risk-taking scare (based on the sun of
the risk preferences over all six items) for the 15 subjects serving in
that condition. Lower scores signify greater risk taking.

38

TABLE 3
Overall Analysis of Variance of Individual Risk Scores

Source

df

MS

F

Between Subjects
Interaction level (A)

1

627.27

3.80

Information level (B)

3

416.58

2.52

A x B

3

373.90

2.27

112

165.04

Pre-Post level (C)

1

317.40

28.04**

A x C

1

79.35

7.01*

B x C

3

50.70

4.48*

A x B x C

3

7.29

112

11.32

Error^
Within Subjects

Error
w

*p<.01
**p<.005
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F ratio for the A x C interaction.

Hie significance of this ratio

indicates that pre to post risk-taking shifts were dependent on level
of social interaction.
interaction.

Figure 1 describes the nature of the statistical

A test for sinple main effects (Winer, 1962) was used to

determine the sources of this interaction.

This test is summarized in

Table 4.
TABLE 4
Analysis of Variance of Pre-Post Measures for Social
Interaction Levels

Source

df

MS

F

C for A^

1

357.07

31.54**

C for

1

39.67

3.50

112

11.32

Errorw

«p<.ffi53-------------------------------------------------------------

The results of this test indicate that there vas a significant shift
toward risk under interacting but not under non-interacting conditions.
Hypothesis 2 stated that the shift to risk would be greatest under
full information, next greatest for pro and con information and also
risk-level information, and smallest for the no-information or control
condition.

The main effect for information was not significant but there

was a statistical interaction effect between information level and pre
post level.

The significance of the B x C interaction indicates that

pre to post risk-taking shifts were dependent upon level of information
given.

Figure 2 represents this interaction graphically.

Table 5 presents
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= interaction
32

Aj = no interaction

31
30
Mean Risk
Score Over

29

M l Items
28
27
26
25

Posttest

Pretest
Figure 1

Risk Taking Shifts as a Function of Level of Social Interaction
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= full information
= pro and con information
= risk-level information
= no information
35
34
33
32
Mean Risk

31

Score Over
30
All Items
29
28
27
26
Pre

Post

Figure 2
Risk Taking Shifts as a Function of Information Level
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the results of a test for sinple main effects performed upon the interac
tion.
TABLE 5
Analysis of Variance of Pre-Post Measures far
Information Levels

Source

df

MS

F

C for

1

248.1

21.92**

C far B_
2
C for B3

1

205.4

18.14**

1

11.2

C for B
4
Error
w

1
112

<1
<1

11.32

**p/.005
The two significant F's indicate that there was a definite shift toward
risk under full information and pro and con information but not under
risk-level information and no information.
To determine if the magnitude of these shifts differed statis
tically fran one another a special shift score was computed.

Mean pre

and post risk scores far each information level were obtained by averaging
across the social interaction factor.

Subtraction of the post score

fran the pre score yielded a mean shift score for each information level
(See Table 6).
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TABLE 6
Mean Shift Soares Under Each Information Condition
B,
“

B
2

3

B
4

4.06

3.70

0.86

0.30

These shift scares were then compared by means of a Neman Keuls post
hoc test (Winer, 1962).

The results of this test indicated that shifts

under both full information (B^) and pro and con information (B2) were
greater than those under risk-level information (B^) and no information
(B^).

The shifts under full information and pro and con information

were not significantly different from one another.

Also, there was no

difference between risk-level shifts and no information shifts.

All of

these shifts are averaged across social interaction levels.
Hypothesis 3 stated that the presentation of risk-level information
and full information would evoke comparable shifts under both group and
alone conditions virile shifts observed under other information levels
would be different for non-interacting and interacting conditions.

The

F ratio for the A x B x C interaction was not significant and, thus, no
support can be given to this hypothesis.
To gain further information about risk-taking shifts for specific
experimental cells an analysis of sinple, sinple effects for the pre
post factor was performed (Winer, 1962).

The results are presented in

Table 7.
Highly significant shifts to risk resulted fran both fullinformation and pro and can information conditions when these were
combined with a group setting (C for A^B^; C for A^B2). Marginally
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TABLE 7

Analysis of Variance of Pre-Post Soores far Individual Cells

Source

df

C for AjB^

1

258.14

22.80**

C for A^B2

1

213.34

18.85**

C for AjB3

1

22.54

1.99

C for

1

5.64

<1

C for AjB^

1

38.54

3.40*

C for A 2B2

1

32.03

2.82*

C for

1

0.00

<1

C for A„B.
2 4

1

0.53

<1

112

11.32

Error
w

F

MS

*p<.l0
**p<.001
A^ = interaction

= full information

A2 = no interaction

= pro and con information
Bj = risk-level information

C = pretest-posttest factor

B = no information
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significant risky shifts (p .10) were obtained when full-infarmation and
pro and con information were presented in an alone setting (C for
C for

* T*ie shifts in the other four experimental cells were small

and did not approach an acceptable level of statistical significance.
To determine whether or not the magnitude of the four significant
shifts differed fran one another mean shift scores were confuted and
conpared (Table 8).
TARTR 8

Mean Shift Soores for Full-Information and Pro and Con
Information Under Both Group and Alone Conditions

A1B1

a 1b 2

5.77

5.33

a 2B2

2.27

2.07

The results of a Newman Keuls test indicate that the means in the group
condition (A-jB^ and A^,) were significantly greater than the corresponding
means in the alone condition (AjB^ and A ^ ) • Full-infarmation produced
a significantly greater shift in the group condition than in the alone
condition.

The pro and con shift was also significantly greater under

group than under alone conditions. There was no significant difference
between full information and pro and con information when ccnpared under
either interacting or no-interacting conditions.

Thus, no greater shift

was obtained under full information than under pro and con information
regardless of level of social interaction.
In sun, both full information and pro and con information produced
approximately equal shifts in risk taking.

In the group condition these

shifts were significantly larger than in the alone condition.
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DISCUSSION
Only one of the three hypotheses was confirmed by the data.
There was a significantly greater shift to risk under group than under
alone conditions,

Vhile definite risky shifts were obtained in an alone

condition far both full information and pro and con information this
informational effect was greatly enhanced by the addition of group inter
action.

Thus, there is strong reason to believe that the full risky

shift is not a psuedo group effect.

The shift could have been considered

a pseudo group effect-if there had been little or no difference between
group and alone conditions.
The second hypothesis was an extrapolation from Brown's value
position.

The prediction was that both risk-level and pro and con infor

mation would evoke small shifts of comparable magnitude and that only
when both factors were jointly incorporated into the set of stimulus
conditions would the full shift occur.
disconfizmed.

This expectation was emphatically

Shifts obtained from pro and con information alone were

of approximately the same magnitude as the full information shifts.

In

contrast, risk-level information was strikingly ineffectual. No shifts
occurred in the alone condition and only small nonsignificant shifts
under group conditions.

The difference between the pro and ccnneffect

and the risk-level effect was highly significant.

It appears on the

basis of this data that a large portion of the variance can be accounted
for by the oontentual arguments provided in group discussion while the
role of risk-level exchange is negligible.
The third hypothesis was a specific deduction from Brown's theory.
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If the only information of relevance Is the risk levels of others the
presentation of this information should be equally effective in both
grot?) and alone conditions.

Clearly, this was not the case.

There vras

no shift in the alone condition and a small nonsignificant shift in the
group condition.

These results follow the general trend observed in the

other experimental cells, namely that group interaction acted to increase
the posttest risk level.

In sum, the interaction and information factors

combined in an additive rather than an interactive fashion.
Taken as a whole, the pattern of results are in striking disaccord
with Brown's notion of the value process.

Brown explicitly disclaims the

role of the substantive content of the discussions and, instead, insists
that it is "...the information about other people's answers that makes
individuals move toward greater risk after group discussion (p. 702)."
In this study information about other people's answers had little or no
effect but the reasons behind the answers, the substantive arguments, had
a great effect.

Congruent with this finding are sane of the results

from a study by 2ajone, Wblosin, Wblosin and Loh (1970).

Vhen subjects

responded alone or in the presence of others to a simple two-choice
betting task the tendency over a series of 360 trials was a gradual shift
in the conservative direction. As a consequence of hearing others respond
first there was a slight retardation of this effect.

The authors conclude

that the sheer knowledge of others' answers does not produce a shift to
either risk or conservatism, at least in a two-choice betting paradigm.
The results argue persuasively against both the leadership
hypothesis and the responsibility-diffusion theory.
implications for the leadership hypothesis.

Consider first the

In several of the experimental

conditions in which a shift to risk occurred a high-risk leader , if
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present, had little opportunity to influence his fellow discussants.

For

example, in the pro and con only conditions each group member is ignorant
of how the others actually answered.

A high-risk member may present

more relevant argu ments for the risky action but he is deprived of the
means for pointing out the ideal risky position.

He cannot, for example,

lead a member who opted for 7 in 10 to the more risky position of 3 in
10.

He kncws neither the other member's position nor has he any viable

means for communicating his own.

The leadership dimension is even further

removed in the related condition where subjects did not interact but
read the pro and con transcripts of the previous discussions.
there was no leader in the usual sense of the word.

Certainly

Yet, intboth group

and alone conditions there were definite shifts to risk.

This, of course,

merely indicates that the shift to risk can occur in the absence of
explicit leadership.

It does not indicate that a risky leader cannot

produce a shift under more usual conditions.

However, as noted earlier,

other studies have failed to find a leadership effect.
The responsibility-diffusion theory holds that shared interactional
experiences bring about the formation of affective bonds which in turn
mediate a spread of responsibility. This, then, could hardly explain the
occurrence of risky shifts in the two alone conditions where transcripts
were read.

Perhaps one could posit the occurrence of vicarious group

experience as a response to the transcript and the subsequent formation
of imaginary affective bonds resulting in a diffusion of responsibility
and a subsequent shift to risk.
certainly non-parsimonious.

This interpretation, while possible, is

At any rate the presence of a control condition

(no information) in which subjects discussed irrelevant problems before
taking the posttest appears to obviate this possibility.

Any discussion,
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if this theory is correct, should stimulate the formation of affective
bonds necessary fen: the diffusion of responsibility.
tion the amount of shift was negligible.

Yet, in this condi

Perhaps only certain types of

discussions promote responsibility diffusion.

If so, the theory obviously

needs to be revised to take this into account.
The results have little bearing on the familiarization hypothesis
as proposed by Bateson (1966).

It could be posited, though, that a type

of familiarization was involved in those conditions in which subjects
read transcripts of prior group discussions.

However, the additional

arguments were produced by outside sources rather than by the subjects
themselves.

Also, contrary to what Bateson would predict, these arguments

by themselves were not sufficient to produce the full shift to risk.
Nevertheless, a reasonable interpretation might be that the recognition
of the relevance of additional information leads to an increased willing
ness to support the risky action.

Perhaps when this information is received

in a group context the additional normative justification strengthens the
effects of the arguments.
Relevant Argument Hypothesis
The relevant-argument position holds basically that the compre
hension of relevant argixnents is the immediate antecedent of the shift
to risk and that these arguments will have a more powerful effect when
produced and reacted to by an interacting group than when presented alone.
Vfriat is needed is a new theory that will provide a comprehensive
interpretation of the shift to risk process.

Such a theory may be

constructed by combining some of the assumptions of the value hypothesis
with a comprehension approach.
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Assure first that any risk-taking item nay engage either the
value on risk or the value on caution.

If the item is a risk-oriented

one it will tend to arouse implicit arguments supporting a risky position.
On the basis of these considerations the individual advocates a relatively
risky stand.

Wien confronted by the additional arguments of others, also

elicited by the shared value on risk, the individual becomes willing to
advocate an even riskier stand.

Perhaps the greater the number of un

familiar but relevant arguments he is exposed to the more he will shift
his decision toward the risky end of the scale.

At any rate, these

arguments will be effective whether they arise through the give and take
of group discussion or whether they are presented in an individual
familiarization paradigm.

However, should they arise through a face to

face discussion they take on additional salience and the result is a
much stronger shift to risk.
Support far this last statement can be found in a recent study
by Willems (1969).

When asked to estimate how others will respond to

risk-oriented items subjects consistently guess that these others will
respond more conservatively than themselves (Hinds, 1962; Vkllach and
Wing, 1968;

Levinger and Schneider, 1969).

individuals on this estimation index.

Willems ccnpared groups and

He found that groups are even more

likely than individuals to report that they are taking more risk than
others.

Willems suggests that group interaction increases the salience

of the value specified,

ftiis increased salience may be due to norm-

sending processes within the group.

Whatever the case, the group

recognition of the risky value may well act as an extra weighting
mechanism for risk-supporting arguments.
In short, it is proposed that presence of additional information
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is the most direct cause of the shift to risk.
of comprehension process.

This assumes seme sort

The stimulus for the production of these argu

ments in a group setting can be found in the value mechanism.

This value

becomes more salient when it is recognized by five people rather than
just one and it is this increased salience that serves to give greater
weight to the group-produced arguments.

Thus, the shift to risk will be

of a greater magnitude in a group than an individual context even though
the specific information is the same for both.
A proposal which is similar in some respects has recently been
made by Madaras and Bern (1968). They suggest that

..the crucial infor

mation transmitted in the group is not about the risk levels of others,
according to this hypothesis, but about specific information regarding
the situation being discussed (p. 359)." To test their conjecture they
split a ten-item Choice Dilemma questionnaire into two five-item subtests.
After completing the full ten-item pretest groups discussed one of the
five-item subtests and following discussion made new choices on the full
ten-item test.

The authors reasoned that if the crucial information

transmitted in discussion is, as Brown suggests, the risk levels of
others then subjects would become aware of their relative risk positions
in the group and would alter their subsequent decisions an both the
discussed and undiscussed items.

Since significant shifts occurred only

for the items actually discussed the authors concluded that Brown's risklevel hypothesis cannot account for the results while their specific
argument hypothesis can.
Unfortunately, the Madaras and Bern study is very wBak.

First, it

is not at all clear that this prediction can be deduced from Brown's
hypothesis.

In fact, it would be reasonable to assure that a hypothetical
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subject who begins with the assumption that he is relatively risky com
pared to others would hold to this view until specifically discontinued.
Although he may receive contradictory information on the items actually
discussed he may still assume that he is relatively risky on others.
Secondly, this study is in no sense a test of the specific argument
hypothesis.

There was no direct manipulation of the amount or type of

arguments involved.
default.

In fact, their conclusion is built on support by

Since, in their opinion, the risk-level hypothesis was discon-

firmed the specific-argunent hypothesis mist have been supported.

However,

disaffirming one hypothesis does not necessarily lend support to another.
The results could equally well be construed as support for the leadership
hypothesis or the comprehension hypothesis.
conclusions would seem more appropriate.

In fact, either of these

There was no group interaction

and thus no leader on the last five items nor were there any instructions
given for further individual study.

In sum, the experiment neither

disaffirms Brown's hypothesis nor supports that of Madaras and Bern.
The Madaras and Bern report is the only one avowedly concerned
with the relevant argument hypothesis.

However, several other studies

provide data that can be reinterpreted in terms of this mechanism.
The most immediately relevant study is NordhfzJy's (1962) master's
thesis.

After listening to the tapes of Stoner's original discussion

groups Nordh^y devised a content analysis scheme for categorizing the
verbal content of the discussions.

Individual statements were classified

into those favoring risk and those favoring caution.

The consistent

finding was that mare arguments favoring risk always preceded a shift to
risk and more arguments favoring caution always preceded a shift to
conservatism.

Nordhtfy felt that the arguments expressed tended to be a

53
reflection of values commonly accepted in the culture.

This was actually

the first statement of a value hypothesis which was later extended and
refined by Brown (1965). Far our purposes the important point is that
NOrdhfrfy adduces evidence that relevant arguments play a role in the shift
to risk.

The position to be defended here is that these arguments are

a direct cause of the shift to risk.
Consider also the Kogan and Vfallach (1967c) study in which
individual subjects listened to tape recordings of groups discussing the
Choice Dilemma items.

The major finding was that subjects in the listening

conditions shewed a shift to risk which, although statistically significant,
was consistently smaller than that for the discussion groups.

The experi

menters interpreted these results as providing negative evidence with
respect to the value and comprehension formulations but supporting
evidence for their own responsibility-diffusion theory.

However, the

results also fit in neatly with the relevant-argument hypothesis.

In

the listening condition subjects became aware of additional arguments
relevant to each problem item.

Thus, the weight of these additional

considerations prompted them to opt for greater risk in the posttest.
However, since these arguments did not arise through face-to-face inter
action that directly involved the subject they were deprived of partici
pation in the development of a group norm favoring risk,

in the original

discussion, however, group members were exposed to the identical arguments
that the listeners heard yet the resulting shift was of a significantly
greater magnitude.

This finding is compatible with our two-process

relevant-argument hypothesis.

In the original interacting condition

the same argixnents had a stronger effect due to the additional normative
salience.
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Several studies (Teger and Pruitt, 1967; Clark and Willems, 1969)
have shown that a small but significant shift results when group members
exchange risk-level information but do not enter into a substantive
discussion.

The current investigation found a small, hut nonsignificant

shift for this condition.

Such a finding, in addition to offering support

for Brown's risk-level hypothesis, would seem to militate against the
relevant-argument hypothesis.
given in this condition.

Consider, however, the instructions typically

To justify his manipulation in the eyes of the

subject the experimenter usually indicates that the purpose of this procedure
is to see if the diversity of views expressed will cedi to mind additional
considerations that the subject has not previously thought of.

Part of

Teger and Pruitt's final instructions for this condition read "...possibly
by comparing notes with each other and reconsidering each problem...you
will have a better idea of the kind of decision that you would like to
make."

In addition, subjects are told, "consider what you are doing as

a farm of discussion" and "you might want to change your decision after
comparing it with others and thinking about it longer." It is quite
possible that the subjects construed the enphasis on "comparing notes,"
"reconsidering each problem," and "thinking about it longer" as enocuragLig them to think of additional pros and cans relevant to the problem
situation.
paradigm.

This would render the condition similar to a familiarization
However, if we assume that the subject originally thought of

relatively risk-provoking arguments and now finds that certain others
are even riskier he may well try to think of other pro-risk arguments
that could support this position.

In addition, his involvement in the

interactional process may serve to initiate normative weighting for the
argraents he has already thought of.

Such a procedure could conceivably
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lead to a posttest shift to risk.

The shift would be small, however,

because of the severe constraint on the information-exchange process.
Strong support for the risk-level hypothesis appears to be given
in the recent study by Vidmar (1968).

Included in his results is an

internal analysis of the degree of shift exhibited by each group member
on each item.

In general, the amount of shift for each of the other

group members was inversely proportional to his rank ordering in the group.
Thus the individual who held the lowest rank, i.e. the most conservative
member, shifted the most, the second most conservative member shifted
slightly less, and so on until we reach the high-risk individual who did
not shift at all.

This is directly in line with Brown's proposal that

if an individual values risk, the farther behind the others he finds
himself the more catching up he has to do.

However, the relevant-argument

position holds that an individual's initial responses depend on the pros
and cons he is able to think up for himself.

If he can think up few

arguments in favor of the risky action he is likely to take a moderate
or conservative position,

When he then enters into group discussion he

is likely to discover many additional pro-risk arguments.

In ffct, the

greater the number of new arguments he hears the more he should shift.
The high-risk individual has already thought up many pro-risk arguments
and thus is likely to hear few if any novel arguments.
shift is small or nonexistent.

Consequently his

It is also plausible to assume that a

moderate-risk individual has taken his position on the basis of a smaller
number of pro-risk arguments.

Wien he hears additional arguments he is

justified in shifting toward greater ride.
probably not this sinple.

Of course, matters are

In addition to the absolute number of arguments

their relative importance and perceived relevance should also have an
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effect.

Obviously this interpretation is ad hoc and would have to be

tested on the basis of new data.

What is inportant though is that

Vidmar's results do not provide unambiguous support for the risk-level
hypothesis.
Vidmar's results are paralleled to sane extent by the findings
of Wallach and Mabli (1970).

Three-person discussion groups were formed

with either a conservative majority or a risky majority.

In both condi

tions the initially conservative members showed strong, approximately
equal shifts to risk while the risky members evinced snail, nonsignificant
shifts to conservatism.

Pursuing his new-found devotion to value theory,

Wallach interprets these results as especially dramatic evidence in favor
of the exchange-of-risk-levels hypothesis.

Again, however, a lively

possibility is that the conservatives shifted because they were exposed
to new arguments in favor of the risky solution. Assuming an initial
value on risk they were new provided with additional justification for
moving toward a more desirable risk level.

Risk takers, on the other

hand, probably were not exposed to additional risky arguments and, in
fact, may have been confronted with sane of the cautious concerns of
the conservative members.

This may have accounted for the small, insig

nificant trend toward conservatism.
To recapitulate, the model presented here consists of four basic
propositions.

First, each problem situation will elicit the value on

risk, the value on conservatism, or no value at all (in which case there
will be no consistent shifts in risk taking). This is in line with
Brown's initial value famulation and the evidence to date (e.g. Stoner,
1968) sasms to indicate that this is a viable assumption.

Second, when

deciding upon an initial response each individual will take into
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consideration sane of the pros and cons attached to the risky action.
The amount of risk he takes will depend, in part, on the number of risky
arguments he is able to produce and the importance he attaches to each.
Third, individual shifts to risk will occur as a function of the respon
dent being presented with additional relevant arguments or other informa
tion that increases the importance of arguments he has already produced.
Fourth, the magnitude of these shifts will be greatly increased when
this additional information grows out of an interactional context of
which the individual is a part.

It was suggested that the mechanism

responsible for this last step may be the increased salience given to
risky arguments as a function of group recognition of the value.

When

caution-oriented items are involved the model should work in analogous
fashion to produce conservative shifts.
Implications for Future Research
Since the model is presented a posteriori rather than a priori
it is clearly in need of an independent test.
proceed along several lines.

Future research could

Perhaps the most fruitful first step would

be a replication of the present design using both risk-oriented and
caution-oriented items.

The model predicts small shifts to conservatism

when additional conservative arguments are presented in an individual
familiarization paradigm and significantly larger shifts to conservatism
when the same arguments arise through group discussion.

These shifts

should occur regardless of whether or not the announcement of initial
risk levels aooarpanies the relevant arguments.

Any theory which proposes

to account for the shift to risk must also account for those instances
in which there is a shift to conservation.

The explanation gains
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generality if both types of shift can be accounted far by invoking the
same theoretical processes.
As previously mentioned the first proposition has already received
considerable empirical support.

On those items which shift to risk

people see others as taking less risk than they themselves (Hinds, 1962;
Stoner, 1968; Whllach and Wing, 1968; Levinger and Schneider, 1969).

In

addition, they also see the ideal level of risk as being slightly riskier
than their original answers (Levinger and Schneider, 1969).

Stoner

(1968) has shown that on risk-shifting items subjects consistently rank
value statements associated with the risky alternative as more important
than value statements associated with the conservative alternative.
Also, risk-aooepbors are viewed more favorably than risk-rejectors
(Madaras and Bern, 1968).

Thus, it seems reasonable to postulate that

risky items evoke seme sort of widely shared value on risk.

However,

it remains to extend these value-specification indices to group betting
situations of the type used by Pruitt and Teger (1969) and the problemsolving formats of wailach, Kogan and Bern (1965).
The evidence is not as clear with respect to cautious items.
Levinger and Schneider found that on the two Choice Dilemma items that
had previously shown shifts to conservation there was a tendency for
others to be seen as holding riskier positions.

However, ideal choices

were also seen as somewhat more risky than subjects' own positions.
Stoner (1968) tested six caution-oriented items, two made up by Nordhtfy
(1962) and four which he constructed in an attempt to elicit cautious
values.

On five of these subjects saw others as being mare risky.

all six there was a tendency to rank the value statement associated
with the conservative alternative as more important than the value

On

59

statement associated with the risky alternative.

Unfortunately, only

two of the six items showed significant shifts to conservatism while
for one there was actually a significant shift to risk (this was the
item on which subjects saw others as being more conservative). Evidently
shifts to conservatism are much harder to produce than shifts to risk.
Future research should concentrate more heavily an the conditions under
which shifts to conservatism will or will not occur.

Brown (1965)

suggests that items will go conservative when the vital interests of
others are at stake.

Rabow et. al. (1966) feel that conservative shifts

will be obtained when the risky action conflicts with societal norms.
However, several of Stoner's four items which failed to shew a conservative
shift did involve the vital welfare of others (items #1 and #6 of the
Stoner list) and one of his two successful conservative shifts was found
for an item which neither involved the vital interests of others nor
seemed to be in conflict with any widely accepted norms (item #2). A
new approach seems warranted.

This might involve scaling the perceived

reinforcement value of the gain versus the perceived magnitude of the
stake.

Perhaps when the stake outweights the gain there will be a

tendency to shift to conservatism.

It would appear that the most important

contribution that could be made to the risk-shift literature would be
the development of a general prescription that would specify in advance
how a risk-shifting or conservative-shifting item should be constructed.
Besides contributing to our understanding of the shift phenomenon the
existence of such a prescription would, as Brown points out, "...be a
general statement about American culture (p. 705)."
The second proposition has not yet been tested.

There is evidence

to shew that people initially answer risk-shifting items in a relatively

60
risky fashion and conservative-shifting items in a relatively cautious
fashion (Pruitt and Teger, 1967? Stoner, 1968).

Hcwever, this does not

necessarily indicate that they do so on the basis of implicit risky or
conservative arguments or, further, that the number or perceived importance
of such argunents bears any relation to the extremity of the response.
It is probably impossible to ascertain with any certainty what goes on
in a person's mind when lie is making a decision.

You could ask him

afterwards to indicate the pros and cons he considered but there is
always the possibility that his post-decision responses represent justi
fications rather than true antecedents.

Inquiring before the decision

is made probably constitutes an invasion and disruption of the natural
ongoing process.

Despite these factors, however, we would expect that

the number and perceived importance of the relevant arguments reported
by the subject should bear some relation to the degree of risk actually
taken.

One could proceed by asking the subject to list the pros and

cons attached to the risky action and to indicate by means of a rating
scale how important each is for the making of the decision.

The relevant-

argument theory holds that on risk-oriented items the pros will outnumber
the cons and further that the average degree of impart attached to the
pro statements will outweigh the import of the con statements.

In

addition, across subjects there should be a positive correlation between
number of pros adduced and initial risk.

Perceived inpart of the risky

arguments should also correlate positively with initial risk.

Negative

correlations should be found between number and importance of conservative
argunents and initial risk.

Such evidence, if found, would constitute

support for our second proposition and might be useful as an additional
index for distinguishing between risk-shifting and conservative-shifting
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items.
The third proposition is the most crucial since it presents a
major alternative to the exchange-of-risk-levels hypothesis.

Hie conten

tion that the presentation of additional relevant argunents is an immediate
cause of the shift to risk can easily be tested.

Hie most direct approach

is to simply present additional risky or conservative arguments in an
individual familiarization paradigm.

Posttest responses should show a

net shift to risk on risk-oriented items and to conservatism on cautionoriented items.

But vftat would be the effect of presenting additional

conservative arguments for a risk-oriented item? According to the relevantargument approach there would be a tendency to shift in the conservative
direction.

However, since the value specifies risk the net shift should

be small; smaller than the risky shift when risky arguments are presented.
Conservative arguments should not be weighed as heavily as risky arguments.
In fact, this contention can easily be tested by presenting both types of
argunents and asking the subject to rate the perceived importance of each.
As a corollary to this third proposition we could posit that
the magnitude of the shift will be a positive function of the nurber of
unfamiliar argunents provided.

A direct measure of this can be obtained

if we ask the subject to specify pros and cans before the initial response
and eliminate from the familiarization material the arguments that he
has already thought of.

A similar relationship should hold when we take

into consideration the perceived importance of the new arguments; the
greater the sunmated ratings for perceived importance the greater the
degree of shift.
The last proposition, that these argunents should have greater
effect when presented in an interactional context, is not as easy to
test.

The presentation of individual arguments is rather readily controlled
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by the experimenter but the manipulation of discussion is an entirely
different matter.

A restricted ccmnunication paradigm where the subject

cannunicates to others by written message provides a possible approach.
The experimenter could directly control the group discussion content
through the introduction of bogus messages.

Hcwever, such a set up would

represent little mare than an individual familiarization paradigm.

The

only added component is the inpression of interaction with others and the
effect of the inpression may not add up to the effect of the real thing.
A second possible approach is analogous to the one used here.

Allow a

normal group discussion and abstract the relevant arguments front a tran
script of the proceedings.

The presentation of the same argiments in a

non-interactional setting should produce a shift, but one considerably
smaller than in the actual discussion.

Perhaps the best approach would

be the employment of confederates in the group discussion.

The confederates

are provided with a standard list of relevant arguments and are instructed
to insert these argunents at appropriate times in the course of the dis
cussion.

By employing say four confederates and one naive subject the

experimenter should retain fairly good control over the verbal content
fran one group discussion to the next.

The prediction, of course, is

that the same argunents will have a significantly greater effect when
deliberately presented in a group-context than when presented alone.
In sun, the relevant-arguient hypothesis has not yet been subjected
to a critical test on the basis of independent data.
importance of collecting such data now seems clear.

However, the
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APPENDIX
Risk-taking Questionnaire
Instructions
On the following pages, you will find a series of situations that
are likely to occur in everyday life. The central person in each situation
is faced with a choice between two alternative courses of action, which
we might call X and Y. Alternative X is more desirable and attractive
than alternative Y, but the probability of attaining or achieving X is less
than that of attaining or achieving Y.
For each situation on the following pages, you will be asked to
indicate the minimum odds of success you would demand before reccrmending
that the more attractive or desirable alternative X be chosen.
Read each situation carefully before giving your judgment. Try
to place yourself in the position of the central person in each of the
situations. There are six situations in all. Please do not emit any
of them.
1. Mr. A, an electrical engineer, who is married and has one child, has
been working for a large electronics corporation since graduating from
college five years ago. He is assured of a lifetime job with a modest,
though adequate, salary, and liberal pension benefits upon retirement.
On the other hand, it is very unlikely that his salary will increase much
before he retires. While attending a convention, Mr. A is offered a job
with a small, newly founded company which has a highly uncertain future.
The new job would pay more to start and would offer the possibility of a
share in the ownership if the company survived the competition of the
larger firms.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below are several proba
bilities or odds of the new company's proving financially sound.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable
to mate it worthwhile for Mr. A to take the new 30b .
The chances should be at least 1 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
The chances should be at least 3 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
The chances should be at least 5 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
The chances should be at least 7 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
The chances should be at least 9 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
Place a check here if you think Mr. A should not take the new job
unless it is certain that the company would survive.
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2. Mr. B, a competent chess player is participating in a national chess
tournament. In an early match he draws the top-favored player in the
tournament as his opponent. Mr. B has been given a relatively lew ranking
in view of his performance in previous tournaments. During the course
of his play with the top-favored man, Mr. B notes the possibility of a
deceptive though risky maneuver which might bring him a quick victory. At
the same time, if the attempted maneuver should fail, Mr. B would be left
in an exposed position and defeat would almost certainly follow.
Imagine that you
bilities or odds that
Please check the
for the risky play in

are advising Mr. B. Listed below are several proba
Mr. B's deceptive play would succeed.
lowest probability that you would consider acceptable
question to be attempted.

Place a check here if you think Mr. B should not attempt the risky
play unless its success could be assured.
The chances should be at least 9 in 10 that the risky play would
succeed.
The chances should be at least 7 in 10 that the risky pi^y would
succeed.
The chances should be at least 5 in 10 that the risky play would
succeed.
The chances should be at least 3 in 10 that the risky play would
succeed.
The chances should be at least 1 in 10 that the risky play would
succeed.
3. Mr. C, a married 30-year-old research physicist, has been given a five
year appointment by a major university laboratory. As he contemplates
the next five years, he realizes that he might work on a difficult, long
term problem which, if a solution could be found, would resolve basic
scientific issues in the field and bring high scientific honors. If no
solution were found, however, Mr. C. would have little to shew for his
five years in the laboratory, and this would make it hard for him to get
a good job afterwards. On the other hand, he could, as most of his pro
fessional associates are doing, work on a series of short-term problems
where solutions would be easier to find, but where the problems are of
lesser scientific importance.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. C. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds that a solution would be found to the difficult
long-term problem that Mr. C has in mind.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable
to make it worthwhile for Mr. C to work on~tfie more difficult long-term
problem.
Place a check here if
you think Mr. Cshould not choose
the long
term difficult problem unless he is certain to find a solution.
The Chances should be
at
least 9
in 10that Mr.Cwouldsolvethe
problem.
The chances should be
at
least 7
in 10that Mr.
Cwouldsolvethe
problem.
The chances should be
at
least 5
in 10that Mr.Cwouldsolvethe
problem.
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The chances should be at least 3 in 10 that Mr. C would solve the
problem.
Hie chances should be at least 1 in 10 that Mr. C would solve the
problem.

4. Mr. D, a college senior, has studied the piano since childhood, He
has won amateur prizes and given small recitals, suggesting that Mr. D
has considerable musical talent. As graduation approaches, Mr. D has the
choice of going to medical school to become a physician, a profession which
would bring certain prestige and financial rewards; or entering a conservatory
of music for advanced training with a well-known pianist. Mr. D realizes
that even upon completion of his piano studies, which would take many more
years and a lot of money, success as a concert pianist would not be assured.
Imagine that you
probabilities or odds
Please check the
for Mr. D to continue

are advising Mr. D. Listed below are several
that Mr. D would succeed as a concert pianist.
lowest probability that you would consider acceptable
with his musical training.

The chances should be at least 1 in 10 that Mr. D would succeed as
a concert pianist.
The chances should be at least 3 in 10 that Mr. D would succeed as
a concert pianist.
The chances shouldbe
at
least 5in
10
that Mr.
Dwouldsucceedas
a concert pianist.
The chances shouldbe
at
least 7in
10
that Mr.
Dwould succeedas
a concert pianist.
The chances shouldbe
at
least 9in
10
that Mr.
Dwould succeedas
a concert pianist.
Place a check here if you think Mr. D should not pursue his musical
training unless he was certain to succeed as a concert pianist.
5. Mr. F is currently a college senior who is very eager to pursue graduate
study in chemistry leading to the Doctor of Philosophy degree. He has been
accepted by both University X and University Y. University X has a world
wide reputation for excellence in chemistry. While a degree from University
X would signify outstanding training in this field, the standards are so
very rigorous that only a fraction of the degree candidates actually
receive the degree. University Y, on the other hand, has much less of a
reputation in chemistry, but almost everyone admitted is awarded the Doctor
of Philosophy degree, though the degree has much less prestige than the
corresponding degree from University X.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. F. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds that Mr. F. would be awarded a degree at University X,
the one with the greater prestige.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable
to make it worthwhile for Mr. F to enrollTir-Jmveriity X rather than
University Y.
Place a check here if you think Mr. F should not enroll in University
X unless he is certain to be awarded toe degree.
The chances should be at least 9 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
degree from University X.
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The chances
degzee fran
The chances
degree from
Hie chances
degree fran
The chances
degree fran

should be at least
University X.
should be at least
University X.
should be at least
University X.
should be at least
University X.

7 in 10 that Mr. P would receive a
5 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
3 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
1 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a

6. Mr. H is the captain of College X's football team. College X is playing
its traditional rival, College Y, in the final game of the season. The
game is in its final seconds, and Mr. H's team, College X, is behind in
the score. College X has time to run one more play. Mr. H, the captain,
must decide whether it would be best to settle for a tie score with a
play which would be almost certain to work or, on the other hand, should
try a more complicated and risky play which could bring victory if it
succeeded but defeat if not.
Imagine that you
probabilities or odds
Please check the
for the risky play to

are advising Mr. H. Listed below are several
that the risky play would prove successful.
lowest probability that you would consider acceptable
be attempted.

The chances should beat least 1 in 10 that the risky play will work.
The chances should beat least 3 in 10 that the risky play will work.
The chances should beat least 5 in 10 that the risky play will work.
The chances should beat least 7 in 10 that the risky play will work.
The chances should beat least 9 in 10 that the risky play will work.
Place a check here if you feel that the risky play should not be
attempted unless Mr. H was certain that it would work.

